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integration between two countries results in a positive country size effect and a negative effect
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We also identify country pairs where political integration would have been mutually beneficial.
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What is the eﬀect of national borders on economic growth? It is widely recognized that
national borders constitute barriers to trade, thereby limiting the scale of economic activity.1
Moreover, many observers have stressed the importance of economic scale as a determinant of
growth and productivity.2 Together, these ideas suggest that political borders should have an
impact on economic growth and per capita income levels. In this paper, we oﬀer a theoretical
framework to understand the relationship between borders and growth, and we propose an
empirical methodology to estimate this relationship.3
In principle, national borders could have ambiguous eﬀects on a country’s growth per-
formance. To the extent that market size matters, borders can reduce the scale of economic
activity. However, since larger countries tend to trade less with the rest of the world, re-
moving a speciﬁc political border can also result in trade reduction vis-à-vis third countries.4
Finally, borders can shield fast growing countries from slow growing neighbors, and vice versa,
in which case the eﬀect of political integration on growth depends on how it would aﬀect the
determinants of steady-state income levels.
1A vast theoretical and empirical literature documents the eﬀect of national borders and country size on
international trade. See for instance, among many other studies, Helliwell [1998] and McCallum [1988].
2This idea has given rise to a considerable volume of empirical research on the interaction between country
size and trade openness as determinants of economic growth. See Ades and Glaeser [1999] and Alesina,
Spolaore and Wacziarg [2000] for the relationship between growth and market size. A related literature
deals more broadly with the eﬀect of trade on growth, without examining speciﬁcally how this relationship is
mediated by market size. See Frankel and Romer [1998], Rodríguez and Rodrik [2000], Wacziarg [2001]a n d
Sachs and Warner [1995], among many others.
3In his important book on border eﬀects in international trade, Helliwell [1998, chapter 6, p. 112] states
that “assessing the possible growth implications of home preferences is not a job for a one-handed economist,
nor for the faint of heart”. We are not aware of research that tries to accomplish such measurement.
4This eﬀect is referred to as trade diversion in the classical theory of customs unions. See for instance
Vousden [1990], chapter 10. However, as will become clear below, by trade reduction we mean something
diﬀerent from classical trade diversion. Alesina and Wacziarg [1998] document empirically how larger countries
tend to be more closed to trade, after controlling for a variety of determinants of trade volumes. Wacziarg
[2001] shows empirically that larger countries tend to have trade policy regimes that are more closed, after
controlling for a variety of determinants of trade policy. Both of these eﬀects will be features of our theoretical
model.
1We present a theoretical framework accounting for these eﬀects. We start with a simple
thought experiment: consider two countries, for example France and Italy. What would the
growth rate of per capita income in France have been if its border with Italy had not existed,
that is, if they had been a single country? In our model, politically integrated economies can
save on trading costs, generating a market size eﬀect of political integration. Trade openness
responds endogenously to political integration, generating a trade reduction eﬀect. Finally,
political integration can generate changes in the other determinants of steady-state income
levels, besides openness and country size, an eﬀect we call the steady-state determination
eﬀect.
We then turn to an empirical evaluation of the border eﬀect on growth. Firstly, we
estimate the eﬀe c to fm a r k e ts i z eo ne c o n o m i cg r o w t hi nac r o s s - c o u n t r yc o n t e x t . I no u r
speciﬁcation, derived directly from the model, market size can be increased by two means:
expanding the internal market or gaining greater access to foreign markets. Existing empirical
evidence demonstrates that larger countries beneﬁt less from trade openness than smaller
ones in terms of economic growth, suggesting that trade openness aﬀects growth through the
channel of market size.5 As a result, it is also the case that smaller countries face incentives
to adopt more open trade regimes, as demonstrated formally in our model. Therefore, we
also estimate the trade-reducing eﬀect of a larger domestic market.
Together, these estimates allow us to quantify the impact of an exogenous change in
country size on economic growth. We can estimate the eﬀect of speciﬁc borders by creating
hypothetical merged countries (for example the one that would result from France merging
with Italy), and estimating their growth rate. This empirical exercise corresponds to our the-
oretical counterfactual. We present estimates of the market size eﬀect, the trade reduction
eﬀect and the steady-state determination eﬀect for all pairs of adjacent countries and proxi-
mate islands for which data is available. The methodology can be easily extended to a case in
which more than two countries are considering integrating politically. We identify geographic
5In other words, the interaction term between country size and trade openness in a cross-country growth
regression bears a robustly negative sign. See Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg [2000] and Ades and Glaeser
[1999]. Previous ﬁndings pointing to no eﬀects of country size on growth were likely due to the omission of
openness and the interaction term between openness and country size from growth regressions. For example,
the fact that smaller countries tend to be more open could lead researchers to wrongly conclude that country
size did not matter for economic growth.
2zones where political integration would be mutually beneﬁcial to the merging countries, and
discuss the conditions under which this occurs.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a model of economic growth based
on scale eﬀects, and analyzes the eﬀect of borders on growth in this context. Section 3
describes our empirical methodology for estimating the border eﬀect and discusses extensions.
Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Political Integration and Growth
2.1 Assumptions of the Model
This section presents a stylized model that links political borders, international openness and
productive activity. In this model, market size aﬀects growth and income levels, and depends
both on the degree of openness of the economy and on country size. Openness, measured by
the ratio of trade to output, is itself endogenous, and responds to country size via endogenous
barriers to trade.
There is a continuum of regions, measured on the interval [0,W]. Time is continuous.





where ci(t) denotes consumption at time t by the representative household living in region
i,a n dρ > 0.6 At time t region i’s capital and labor are denoted, respectively, by Ki(t) and
Li(t). Both inputs are supplied inelastically and are not mobile across regions. Each region
i produces a speciﬁc intermediate input Xi(t) using the region-speciﬁc capital according to
the following linear production function:
Xi(t)=Ki(t) (2)
There exists a unique ﬁnalgood. Eachregioni produces yi(t) units of the ﬁnal good, according









6As usual, the results generalize to any standard CRRA utility function (C
1−σ
it − 1)/(1 − σ) with σ > 0.
3with 0 < α < 1.x ji(t) denotes the amount of intermediate input j used in region i at time t.
Regions are divided into N countries. Country 1 includes all regions in the interval [0 ,
S1]; country 2 includes all regions in the interval [S1 , S1 +S2], country n includes all regions
in the interval [Sn−1 , Sn−1 + Sn], etc. Each region inelastically supplies one unit of labor
(i.e., Li(t)=1for every i at every t.). Hence, the “size” of country 1 (measured by total
labor) is equal to S1, the size of country 2 is S2, the size of country n is Sn,e t c .
Intermediate inputs can be traded across regions that belong to the same country at no
cost (i.e., we assume no internal barriers to trade). By contrast, if one unit of an intermediate
good j that belongs to country a is shipped to a region that belongs to a diﬀerent country (say,
country b), only (1−ξa−ξb) units of the intermediate good will arrive, where 0 < ξa+ξb ≤ 1.
Hence, the levels of ξn’s measure barriers to trade across national borders.
2.2 Market Equilibrium
Intermediate inputs are sold in perfectly competitive markets. In equilibrium, each unit of
each input will be sold at a price equal to its marginal product. All regions that belong to
the same country will use identical levels of a given input. Hence, we can let xin denote
the amount of input i used in each region of country n. Let Pi(t) denote the market price
of intermediate input i, where region i belongs to country a. Therefore, for every input i
b e l o n g i n gt oac o u n t r ya and for every country n 6= a we must have:
Pi(t)=αxα−1
ia (t)=α(1 − ξa − ξn)αxα−1
in (t) (4)
At each time t, the resource constraint for each input i ∈ [0,W] produced in a region i





E q u a t i o n s( 4 )a n d( 5 )i m p l yt h a te a c hr e g i o ni nc o u n t r ya will use the same amount of










4On the other hand, each region of a country b 6= a will use the following amount of input i
produced in country a:
xib(t)=










The above equations show how ξa is inversely related to the international openness of country
a :t h el o w e ri sξa, the more open is country a (i.e., the higher are its use of foreign inputs
and its exports of domestic inputs).7





Sn(1 − ξa − ξn)
α
1−α]1−αKi(t)α−1 (8)
Households’ net assets in region i are identical to the stock of region-speciﬁcc a p i t a lKi(t).
Since each unit of capital yields one unit of intermediate input i, the net return to capital is
equal to the market price of intermediate input Pi(t) (for simplicity, we assume no depreci-
ation). From standard intertemporal optimization we have the following Euler equation for





= Pi(t) − ρ = α[Sa +
X
n6=a
Sn(1 − ξa − ξn)
α
1−α]1−αKi(t)α−1 − ρ (9)











Sn(1 − ξa − ξn)
α
1−α] (10)











Sn(1 − ξa − ξn)
α
1−α] (11)
Our model has standard neoclassical implications as far as the growth rate is concerned. In
particular, at each point in time the growth rate of income per capita is positively related to
steady-state income per capita and negatively related to the current (initial) level of income:9
7Below we will explictly derive “openness” as the ratio of exports to output.
8Equation (11) is obtained from equation (3) by susbtituting domestically-produced and imported inter-
mediate inputs with their equilibrium values, as speciﬁed in equations (6) and (7), and Ki with its stead-state
value in (10) .













Therefore, the eﬀects of size, openness or other variables on the level of income per capita
also translate into eﬀects on the growth rate in the transition to the steady-state. Thus, in
this theoretical section we will focus our analysis on steady-state income. Implications for
growth will be studied in the empirical section.
2.3 Steady-state income, country size and openness
We are now ready to derive the relationship between income per capita, country size and
barriers to trade. Speciﬁcally, equation (11) implies the following:
Proposition 1 - A country’s income per capita in steady-state is increasing in the coun-
try’s size and decreasing in the country’s barriers to trade. All other things equal, barriers
reduce income more in smaller countries, and size is more important for countries with higher
barriers to trade.
Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x1.
As we have mentioned, barriers to trade are directly related to degree of a country’s
openness. Let Oa measure the exports to output ratio in country a. We will refer to this
measure as “openness.”10 Steady-state Oa can be easily derived as follows. Each region in
country a will use xss
ia units of inputs locally, and will sell an equal amount xss
ia to each of the
other Sa − 1 regions belonging to country a. Hence, total exports of input i will be given by
Kss
i −Saxss
ia. Since all regions in country a export the same amount, total exports in country
a are given by (Kss
i − Saxss
ia)Sa. Country a’s total output is given by yss
i Sa. Therefore, the









10In this model we abstract from international borrowing and lending - hence exports are always equal
to imports in equilibrium. Therefore, measuring openness as exports/output is identical, up to a scalar
multiplication, to measuring openness as (exports + imports)/output.















Clearly, the above ratio Oss
a is decreasing in ξa and in Sa:
Proposition 2 - Openness in steady-state is inversely related to a country’s size and to
a country’s barriers to trade.
Equation 15 can be used to express steady-state output per capita in equation (11)a sa











As equation 15c l e a r l ys h o w ,Oss
a itself is a function of size Sa. However, it is useful to
consider the partial eﬀects of size and openness on income per capita and their interaction.
That is, it is useful to consider the eﬀect of size on income for given openness and the eﬀect
of openness of income for a given size. Since openness is inversely related to barriers, it is
not surprising that these eﬀects are reminiscent of Proposition 1:
Proposition 3: Income per capita in steady-state is increasing in country size (for given
openness) and increasing in openness (for given country size). The positive eﬀect of size is





































a )2 < 0 (19)
As we will see in the empirical section, the data seem to be consistent with Proposition 3’s
main insights, which point to: a) positive eﬀects of size and openness on income per capita
in steady-state (and hence growth in the transition to the steady-state), and b) a negative
“interaction” between size and openness - meaning that the eﬀect of size is smaller for more
open countries, and the eﬀect of openness is smaller for larger countries.
7As we have already mentioned, “openness” is an endogenous variable, and even for given
barriers, it does depend on size Sa. Moreover, as we will see below, barriers to trade should
also be viewed as an endogenous function of size - a relationship that would introduce an
additional channel through which size will aﬀect openness. This endogenous link between
openness and size will be taken into account in the empirical analysis.
2.4 Endogenous Barriers to Trade
So far, we have considered barriers to trade as given. We will now extend the analysis to






In equation (20), λn is the endogenous reduction in barriers by country n.
Lowering trade barriers may entail political and administrative costs, adjustment costs,
costly improvements in trading infrastructure, etc. We capture the costs of reducing one’s






We assume that each country chooses its degree of barrier reduction λn in order to maximize
income in steady-state minus the convex cost of barrier reduction.11
Therefore, the equilibrium level of barrier reduction λ∗
a for a country a of size Sa is given















11We assume that the costs of barriers reduction are expressed on a per capita basis, and are independent
of country size. In particular, we do not assume that the reduction of barriers presents economies of scale
(say, because barriers reduction is nonrival across regions) or diseconomies of scale (for example, because
of coordination problems, congestion, heterogeneity, which may increase with the number of regions). An
interpretation of our model is that economies and diseconomies of scale in barrier reduction, if they exist,
cancel out. Our results can be extended to a more general model that include net economies or diseconomies
o fs c a l ei nb a r r i e r sr e d u c t i o n .S u c ha ne x t e n s i o ni sa v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
8In general, the equilibrium level of barriers reduction in each country is a function of the size
distribution of all countries.12 Other things being equal, smaller countries tend to have lower


















1−α < 0 (23)
A simple closed-form solution can be obtained for the case α =1 /2. Then, the degree of
barrier reduction λ∗
n that maximizes output per capita minus barriers reduction costs for a














Hence, we have the following:
Proposition 4 - All other things equal, larger countries will have less open trade policies




Similarly, countries with lower costs of reduction (φ)o ral o w e rd i s c o u n tr a t e s( ρ)w i l lb e
more open (that is, will have a lower λn).
2.5 Political Mergers
Now, let us consider a merger between country a (of size Sa) and country b (of size Sb). To











Sn(1 − ξa − ξn)] (26)










Sn(1 − ξm − ξn)] (27)
12We assume that each country will reduce barriers taking other countries’ barriers as given (Nash equilib-
rium). Joint maximization of world welfare would imply lower barriers.
13The result can be generalized to the case of three or more countries.
14It is immediate to check that (23) reduces to (25) for α =1 /2.








[Sb(ξa + ξb) − (W − Sa − Sb)(ξm − ξa)] (28)
In equation (28), the ﬁrst term, (1/2ρ)Sb(ξa+ξb), measures the direct positive scale eﬀect of
t h em e r g e r ,w h i c hw ec a l lt h emarket size eﬀect. It is evaluated at the level of trade barriers
prevailing before the merger and corresponds to adding the size of country b to country a.
The second term in equation (28), (1/2ρ)(W − Sa − Sb)(ξm − ξa), measures the indirect
negative eﬀect of the merger, via a fall in openness. We call this eﬀect the trade reduction
eﬀect. It corresponds to the increase in trade barriers between the regions of former country
a and the rest of the world (i.e., all other countries except country b), brought forth by the
larger size of the merged country (Sm). That is, this eﬀect is due to the fact that the larger
country will be less open with respect to the rest of the world.
Note that there is no guarantee that the net gain in terms of steady-state income (and
growth) will be positive. That is, there is no guarantee that steady-state income per capita
in the new, larger country will be higher than in country a -i . e . ,t h a tyss
m − yss
a > 0.































which, when substituted in equation (28), imply the following:
Proposition 5 - An e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient condition for yss
m − yss
a > 0 is:
Sm = Sa + Sb >W− ξφρ (32)
The intuition for this results is as follows. A higher Sm means a bigger positive eﬀect from
t h em e r g e rv i at h em a r k e ts i z ee ﬀect, because the two merging counties had larger barriers
between themselves before the merger. A larger Sm (relative to W) also means that the rest
of the world is relatively smaller, and therefore the openness reduction eﬀect (with respect
to the rest of the world) has smaller costs.
10It is important to notice that even if a merger increases income per capita, it does not
necessarily imply an increase in consumption per capita and welfare. In order to calculate
changes in consumption and welfare one should subtract the costs related to barriers reduction
and any other costs associated with a merger. For example, a merger may bring about
direct costs in order to eliminate internal barriers to trade. A merger may also imply higher
“heterogeneity” costs due to diﬀerent preferences over public goods, more costly coordination,
etc.15 In our empirical exercises we will focus on changes of income per capita.
2.6 Other Determinants of Steady-State Income Levels
In our model so far, diﬀerent countries’ steady-states diﬀer only because 1)t h e i rs i z ed i ﬀers
and 2) as a result, their level of openness also diﬀers. There are obviously many other
diﬀerences across countries, apart from size, that could yield diﬀerences in steady-state income
levels and openness. In the context of our model, the φ and ρ parameters could diﬀer across
individual countries. Particularly patient countries, or countries where the costs of openness
reduction are lower (for example through natural access to the sea, proximity to trading
partners, and other geographic factors) will have higher levels of steady-state income and
greater levels of openness, all else equal.
Such diﬀerences will not aﬀect country a’s growth performance under political integration
with country b,u n l e s st h e ya ﬀect the other determinants of steady-state income levels and
openness within country a. But it is easy to see that a merger between country a and
country b,w h e nt h e yd i ﬀer along these other dimensions, will change the growth eﬀect of the
merger on country a, to the extent that the merger aﬀects these parameters within country a.
We should stress again that this would only occur if country a’s steady-state and openness
determinants (other than its size and induced openness level) would change under political
integration. This could occur as the result of factor movements such as migration or capital
ﬂows, or changes in geographic factors brought forth by the removal of borders.16
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ec o u n t r i e sd i ﬀer in φ and ρ, the thought experiment described above to
15On the costs of larger, more heterogeneous countries see Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2002).
16For instance, a previously landlocked country can gain easier access to the sea as a result of a political
merger. This could aﬀect the level of openness of the country, and consequently its growth rate. See for
instance Sachs [2001] ,a n dG a l l u pe ta l .[ 1999] for evidence on the importance of geography for growth.
11evaluate the growth incidence of political mergers can be amended to account for changes
in steady-state determinants under a merger. For example, if countries have diﬀerent costs
φ’s, the analysis can be easily generalized as follows. Let φm denote the costs of barriers
reduction in the uniﬁed country of size Sm. Then we have the following:
Proposition 6: A political merger between a country of size Sa and a country of size Sb
will increase income in country a in steady state (that is, yss
m − yss








) > (W − Sa − Sb)(ξ −






In what follows, we will label the eﬀect of potential changes in steady-state determinants,
besides openness and country size, as the steady-state determination eﬀect.
3 Estimating the Growth Eﬀect of Borders
3.1 Basic Methodology
The model presented above, speciﬁcally Proposition 3, suggests that income in steady-state
is positively related to both country size and openness, and negatively related to their inter-
action. Hence, growth in the transition to the steady-state will also be a function of such




= β0 + β1 logyat−τ + β2Oat + β3 logSat
+β4Oat logSat + β0
5Zat + εat (34)
where a refers to a country, Sat denotes country size, Oat denotes trade openness, yat denotes
per capita income, and Zat is a vector of control variables. Compared to our model, we have
simply added additional determinants of steady-state income levels (the Zat variables), which
the model abstracts from, and an error term. The predictions of our model are that β2 > 0,
β3 > 0 and β4 < 0.
In our model, Propositions 2 and 4 suggests that openness is negatively related to country
size. The second part of our econometric model reﬂects the negative relationship between
trade openness and country size:
Oat = α0 + α1 logSat + α0
2Wat + νat (35)
12where Wat is a vector of additional determinants of trade openness and the model predicts
α1 < 0. In this econometric model, the exogenous variables are Sat, Zat and Wat.W e a r e
considering the growth eﬀect of an exogenous change in a country’s size brought about by









7Zat + µat (36)
where the γ coeﬃcients are functions of the parameters of the growth and trade equations,
as deﬁn e di nA p p e n d i x2 .
Deﬁne ∆Gabt as the change in growth of country i resulting from its merger with country
b. Since the only exogenous variable that has changed under a merger is country size, we
term this particular exercise a “size merger”.17 We focus on the expected eﬀect on growth,
as we have little knowledge of what the random component of growth or openness (captured
by εat and νat) would have been had the countries been politically merged during the sample
period.18 Assuming E(νat|Sat,S mt,W at)=0 , the expected eﬀect on the growth rate of
country a of merging with neighbor b, where the size of the merged country is denoted Smt

















Thus, the eﬀect of the merger on growth is a multiple of the percentage increase in country
size, where the multiplicative factor depends on the determinants of openness, the estimated
parameters of the model and the sizes of countries a and b. Since our model predicts that
γ3 = β4α1 is positive, Proposition 4 is also directly apparent in equation (37).
In this basic setup, the induced eﬀect of political integration on growth will depend on
the home country’s size, the size of the country it is considering merging with, and the
determinants of the home country’s trade openness volume. This combines three distinct
eﬀects of political integration on growth. Firstly, the direct (positive) eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s e
17Below we will examine how to account for changes in the Z and W variables under a merger.
18In section 3.3 below, we discuss an alternative method that allows us to include the error term component
of the growth eﬀect of mergers, using the estimated values of error term in the original countries.
13in country size, equal to β3 times the percentage increase in country size resulting from the
merger (log(Smt/Sat)). Secondly, the indirect (negative) eﬀect through openness reduction,
which is equal to β2α1 times the percentage increase in country size. Thirdly, the eﬀect going
through the interaction term, which captures the increasing impact of country size on growth
as openness decreases. This eﬀect, of ambiguous sign, depends on the determinants of a’s
openness level and the sizes of both a and b, and is equal to β4 (α0 + α1 log(SmtSat)+α0
2Wat)
times the percentage increase in country size. It should be noted that the determinants of
openness (Wat) and the sizes of countries a and b can be such that the openness reducing
eﬀect of political integration outweighs the positive direct scale eﬀect of merging. In this
case, ∆Gabt will be negative.
Finally, an exogenous change in openness yielding an equivalent expected change in eco-
nomic growth without a political merger can be computed using equation (34) as:
E(∆Oat|Sat,S mt,W at)=
∆Gabt
β2 + β4 logSat
(38)
The beneﬁts of exogenous increases in openness can thus be directly compared to those of
bilateral political mergers.
3.2 Changes in Conditioning Variables
Equations (37) and (38) implicitly assume that a political merger does not aﬀect the deter-
minants of the home country’s steady-state income level, or the determinants of its openness
levels, other than country size. For example, if France were to merge with Italy, France and
Italy would each retain their own Zat and Wat variables. These may include the savings rate,
investment in human capital, characteristics of governance and government involvement in
the economy, and gravity type factors such as geographic variables. As suggested in Section
2.6, this is clearly an extreme assumption since factors other than the size of the population
alone would likely be diﬀerent in each merged country under political integration, aﬀecting
both growth and the degree of openness. For example, increased migration and capital mo-
bility across countries a and b under a merger will imply that the rates of investment in
human and physical capital will diﬀer compared to what they would have been in the sepa-
rate countries. Taking this steady-state determination eﬀect into consideration generates an
additional sources of ambiguity in the sign of the overall eﬀect of political integration on eco-
nomic growth. Clearly, this eﬀect would tend to be negative for the home country when the
14hypothetical merger is with a country with “worse” overall determinants of the steady-state
income level than itself.
We can relax the assumption that political integration aﬀects growth only through country
size and the induced eﬀect of changes in country size on trade openness by assuming that
other conditioning variables will change in both merged units after political integration, and
in particular that they will take on the same value in a and b under a merger. We term this
alternative scenario “full integration”.
There are obviously many ways to specify what values the other determinants of growth
(the Z variables) and openness (the W variables) will take under full political integration.19
One reasonable assumption is that each of the merged countries would end up with the same
population weighted average of the initial conditioning variables, which we can denote Zmt
and Wmt, where the subscript m denotes that a political merger has occurred and that the
resulting variables are, where applicable, the population weighted averages of the regional
measures.20 The resulting eﬀect of a political merger on growth, ∆Gm





























7 (Zmt − Zat)
This formulation includes the same size eﬀects as equation (37), namely those that occur
through the direct eﬀect of market size, the indirect eﬀect through trade reduction and the
c h a n g e si nt h ei n t e r a c t i o nt e r m .B u ti na d d i t i o nt ot h e s ee ﬀects, we now have the steady-state
determination eﬀect, equal to the terms in the second line of equation (39).21 An important
19For example, we could assume that the merged country is assigned the best - or worst - values of the Z
and W variables from each of country a and b. We choose an intermediate - and more reasonable - assumption
by assigning to the merged country the population-weighted average of these variables from countries a and b.
20Of course, in the case of the land area, the merged variable is the sum of the corresponding areas of
countries a and b.F o rt h ed u m m yv a r i a b l e si no u rs p e c i ﬁcation, the deﬁnitions of the merged variables are
as follows: the merged country is landlocked if both a and b are landlocked; the merged country is an island if
both a and b are islands; the merged country is an oil exporter if either a or b is an oil exporter.
21We can further decompose the steady-state determination eﬀect into the term γ1 log
ymt−τ
yat−τ which reﬂects
15consequence of this framework is that, under full political integration, expected growth will
be equal for both country a and country b.22
To summarize, equations (37) and (39) result from two diﬀerent assumptions about the
eﬀects of political integration on growth; one with complete averaging of steady-state deter-
minants (“full integration”), the other with no changes in these variables (“size merger”).
The eﬀect of a hypothetical merger likely falls in between these two extremes. The corre-
sponding estimates should therefore be viewed as extreme bounds on the eﬀects of bilateral
political mergers on economic growth.
3.3 Treatment of the Error Term
Above, we focused on estimating the expected eﬀects of political mergers on growth, dis-
regarding the unexplained portion of growth and openness in our counterfactual exercises.
Whether to consider the residuals µt and νt from the growth and openness equations when
evaluating the eﬀects of borders on growth is largely a matter of interpretation. On the one
hand, if one believes that they reﬂect omitted determinants of growth and openness, then
they should be treated as another steady-state determination variable (analogous to the W
and Z variables). As it turns out, since the explained portion of growth and openness are
typically on the order of 50% and 60% respectively, in our baseline regressions, accounting for
the unexplained components of growth and openness could alter our estimates of the merger
eﬀects. On the other hand, if one believes that the residuals reﬂect true “randomness”, then
there is no good justiﬁcation for including them in the analysis: we do not know what the
random component of growth would have been, had the countries been merged over the
sample period.
Since both interpretations seem equally defensible, we also present merger eﬀects that take
into account the estimated residuals. Fortunately, we can easily accommodate this change in
diﬀerences in initial income and the terms that are functions of (Wmt − Wat) and (Zmt − Zat),which reﬂect
diﬀerences in steady-state determinants proper. For identical values of the Z and W variables, if country a
starts out with an initial income that is lower than country b’s, full integration will slow a’s growth simply
because it will raise its initial income - the force of convergence implies that countries grow slower, the closer
they are to their steady-states.
22This is not the case when we do not take into account the steady-state determination eﬀect (section 3.1),
because post-merger Z and W variables still diﬀer across a and b.
16our basic empirical methodology. Instead of computing the expected eﬀect of a merger on














and replace γ2, γ3, γ4 and νat with their regression estimates in computing the empirical
∆Ge
abt. In equation (40), the superscript “e” indicates that the residual terms are taken
into account. Note that since the error term of the growth regression, µat, is assumed to be
unchanged between the merged and unmerged states, it gets diﬀerenced away from equation
(40).23
Similarly, and perhaps more interestingly, we could treat the error terms as additional
(unobserved) growth determinants, and compute the empirical ∆Gme
abt directly using the ap-






















[Wmt − Wat] (41)
+γ0
7 [Zmt − Zat]+( νmt − νat)[γ5 logSmt]+µmt − µat
where νmt and µmt are the population weighted averages of νat and νbt and µat and µbt.
Again, this equation involves the same terms as equation (40), with the steady-state determi-
nation eﬀect (including that which results from merging the estimated unexplained portion
of growth) added on.
3.4 Eﬀects of Borders on Steady-State Income Levels
As explained in the theoretical section, because our model shares the dynamic features of
the neoclassical growth model, it is straightforward to present our results in terms of steady-
state income levels rather than growth. We do not observe steady-state income, but it can
be estimated readily under the assumptions of our framework, because the right-hand side
23The only reason νat remains in this equation is the nonlinearity of the eﬀect of country size on growth
brought forth by the interaction term between openness and size in the growth equation.
17variables of equation (34) are the determinants of steady-state income levels. Theory delivers





a − logyat−τ)+εat (42)
where yat is current income per capita, yat−τ is initial income per capita, and yss
a is (un-
observed) income in steady-state.24 Assume that the steady-state level of income takes the
form:
logyss
a = δ1 + δ2Oat + δ3 logSat + δ4Oat logSat + δ0
5Zat (43)
This speciﬁcation choice for logyss
a reﬂects the fact that the right-hand side variables of
empirical growth regressions (except initial income) are to be interpreted as the determinants
of the steady-state level of income in the neoclassical growth model. On the other hand, our




= β0 + β1 logyat−τ + β2Oat + β3 logSat
+β4Oat logSat + β0
5Zat + εat (44)




= λδ1 + λδ2Oat + λδ3 logSat
+λδ4Oat logSat + λδ0
5Zat − λlogyat−τ + εat (45)



















This provides a methodology for backing out the eﬀects of political mergers on steady-state
income levels. The percentage change in the steady-state income level of country a after
merging with country b can be computed in terms of the reduced form parameters deﬁned in
Appendix 2, under the two scenarios under consideration - a pure size merger or full political
integration:
∆YSS abt ≡ E (∆logyss












24See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), p.37 and p.82 for a derivation of this standard speciﬁcation in the
context of the neoclassical growth model.
25Note that β1, the conditional convergence coeﬃcient, is negative.
18and:
∆YSS m
abt ≡ E (∆logyss



















7 (Zmt − Zat)]
Equations (47) and (48) are the analogs to equations (37) and (39), respectively, applied to
income levels rather than growth. Note that equation (47) implies that ∆YSS abt is simply
−1/γ1 times ∆Gabt - hence, since γ1 = β1 is negative, the eﬀect of a size merger on steady-
state income will have the same sign as its eﬀect on economic growth. However, the signs of
∆YSS m
abtand ∆Gm











Ac o u n t r ya that has a positive steady-state level eﬀect ∆YSS m
abt of full integration may
display a negative growth eﬀect ∆Gm
abt simply because it has a suﬃciently low initial level of
income relative to country b (and hence enjoys relatively fast growth holding the steady-state
level of income constant).
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Estimates of the Growth and Openness Equations
4.1.1 Data and Estimators
Equations (34) and (35) can be readily estimated using cross-country data on growth, country
size, openness and other control variables. Our measure of openness consists of the ratio of
imports plus exports to GDP, a commonly used indicator of a country’s overall level of
openness. Moreover, this is precisely the measure derived in the theory of Section 2 (see in
particular Propositions 2 and 3) The measure of country size consists of the log of a country’s
population. The Zit variables are the common determinants of steady-state income levels in
the cross-country literature: male and female human capital, the fertility rate, the ratio of
government consumption to GDP and the rate of physical capital investment (see Barro and
Sala-i-Martin [1995], chapter 12). Finally, the Wit variables consist of common determinants
of openness such as geographic factors (land area, whether a country is landlocked or an
19island, whether it is an oil exporter) and the terms of trade shocks. In order to capture
long-term phenomena, variables are averaged, where appropriate, over the sample period.
Our base estimates for calculating merger eﬀects are based on PPP per capita income data
from version 5.6 of the Penn World Tables. This 1960-1989 sample consists of 96 countries.
A preliminary issue of version 6.0 of this data has recently been circulated, extending the
data to 1998.26 We use this data for the purpose of reestimating equations (34) and (35),
as a robustness check. However, because some of the other conditioning variables are not as
readily available for recent years, the updated sample only features 77 countries. Moreover,
some “important” countries such as Germany are not part of this dataset for the entire sample
period, precluding any calculation of the eﬀect of political mergers on growth for such a key
country in Europe.27 Therefore, in order to maximize the number of mergers we consider,
and to base our estimates on the largest possible sample, we use estimates from version 5.6 of
the Penn World Tables for the purpose of calculating merger eﬀects. Since the estimates of
equations (34) and (35) do not diﬀer much between samples, we are conﬁdent that using the
more recent data would not alter our results - other than by limiting the country coverage.
One issue that arises immediately from our empirical model is the endogeneity of openness
(and the interaction term between openness and country size) in the growth equation. To
address this, we treat equations (34) and (35) as a system of simultaneous equations to be
estimated jointly. Our baseline results therefore consist of three-stage least squares estimates
(3SLS). 3SLS treats all of the exogenous variables in the system (i.e. country size, initial
per capita income, Zit and Wit) as potential instruments for the endogenous variables in
the system (growth, openness and the interaction term between openness and country size).
Given that openness and the interaction term are the only endogenous variables to appear on
the right hand side of either equation in the system, only the Wit variables serve as instruments
for them in the growth regression. As noted above, these variables consist of plausibly
exogenous geographic and terms of trade variables. In addition to these instruments, we can
gain precision by using additional instruments which do not necessarily appear as exogenous
26See http://webhost.bridgew.edu/baten/.
27In the case of Germany, this is due to reuniﬁcation in 1989. The new version of the Penn World Tables
only features data for reuniﬁed Germany since 1990. Our estimates of merger eﬀects refer to West Germany
prior to 1990.
20variables in either the trade or the growth equations.28 Finally, 3SLS allows for cross-equation
covariance in the error terms εit and νit, generating potential eﬃciency gains.29 For the sake
of robustness, we also present results obtained from seemingly unrelated regression (SUR),
as well as regressions excluding the Zit and Wit control variables.
4.1.2 Estimation Results
Tables 1 and 2 display results for the joint estimation of equation (34) and (35). The baseline
estimates used for the merger calculations appear in column (1). The theoretical predictions
are borne out empirically. Speciﬁcally, openness and country size are positively and signif-
icantly related to growth, while their interaction enters negatively and signiﬁcantly. This is
consistent with the model’s results 1 and 3, and extends related ﬁndings in Alesina, Spolaore
and Wacziarg [2000]. Moreover, as expected, country size aﬀects openness negatively. This
is consistent with our theoretical results 2 and 4, and extends previous ﬁndings in Alesina
and Wacziarg [1998].
Several additional observations are called for. Firstly, the pattern of signs and statistical
signiﬁcance is unchanged when the Zit and the Wit control variables are excluded from the
system, and the magnitude of the coeﬃcients of interest is raised. While this speciﬁcation
is likely to be tainted by omitted variables bias, it corresponds directly to the relationships
derived from theory, where countries diﬀered in no other way than size and openness. It
is therefore reassuring that the predictions of the theory hold unconditionally as well as
conditionally. Secondly, as in Frankel and Romer [1999], instrumenting for openness using
geographic variables increases the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient on trade openness
compared to the speciﬁcations that do not account for the endogeneity of openness (SUR).
These results hold up when using the updated dataset for the period 1960-1998, despite
the loss of 15 data points. Due to this, estimates are sometimes less statistically signiﬁcant,
28Following Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg [2000], these are dummy variables for small countries, small
islands, and the interaction terms between population and the each of dummy variables for small countries,
small islands, islands, and landlocked countries. Geographic variables such as these are likely to be plausibly
exogenous with respect to growth, yet aﬀect the level of openness. See Frankel and Romer [1999] for a further
details on employing geographic variables to instrument for openness in growth regressions.
29See Wacziarg [2001] for further technical details on the use of 3SLS to estimate systems of equations in a
cross-country growth context.
21but the pattern of signs and the magnitude of the coeﬃcients are unchanged compared to
the 1960-1989 dataset. Therefore, we are conﬁdent that our estimates of the border eﬀects
on growth would be robust to using coeﬃcients from the updated dataset. As explained
above, we refrain from using these estimates as this would result in a loss of 15c o u n t r i e s ,i n
particular Germany.
Finally, Table 3 presents F-tests on the instruments, from simple OLS regressions of
openness and the interaction term on all of the exogenous variables in the system, for the
1960-1989 data. These F-tests demonstrate that the instruments are jointly related to the
variables they are instrumenting for, at high levels of statistical signiﬁcance.
4.2 The Eﬀects of Hypothetical Mergers
4.2.1 Eﬀects on Expected 1960-1989 Growth
The parameter estimates presented in Tables 1 a n d2c a nb eu s e dt oc a l c u l a t e ,f o rp a i r so f
adjacent countries, what their growth rate would have been had they formed a single country
over the sample period under consideration.30 Namely, we can now calculate the impact of
speciﬁc borders on growth, under alternative deﬁnitions of political integration. As described
above, under a “size merger”, which is reﬂected in equation (37), a political merger simply
entails full access to the neighbor’s markets, without any change in the home country’s Wat
and Zat variables. Under “full integration”, reﬂected in equation (39), both hypothetically
merged countries share the same Wm
at and Zm
at, and therefore the same growth rate under
political integration. Since there is no ap r i o r ireason to prefer one deﬁnition over the
other, we calculate the eﬀect of borders under both deﬁnitions, and further decompose this
eﬀect into the direct positive eﬀect of an increase in country size, the indirect negative eﬀect
via openness reduction, the ambiguous eﬀect via the interaction term, and the steady-state
determination eﬀect.
Table 4 shows summary statistics for these various eﬀects based on 123 hypothetical pair-
wise mergers. A salient feature of these statistics is the wide dispersion of the various eﬀects.
T h ep u r es i z ee ﬀect on growth, ∆G, has a standard deviation of 0.377 and a positive mean of
30We also considered mergers between proximate islands and up to ﬁve neighboring countries, such as the
United Kingdom and Ireland, or the United Kingdom and France. Our results pertain to a total of 123
hypothetical mergers of country pairs (i.e. 246 merger experiments).
220.123 percentage points of growth annually, suggesting that the average country would beneﬁt
from merging with a neighbor based on increased size alone. Indeed, the direct eﬀect of size
on growth, on average, more than outweighs the indirect eﬀect via openness reduction (while
the interaction eﬀect is on average very close to zero). Under a full integration scenario,
however, a typical country would lose slightly, on the order of ∆Gm = −0.112 percentage
points of annual growth. Since the diﬀerence between ∆Gm and ∆G is equal to the steady-
state determination eﬀect, the latter is on average negative (and equal to −0.235). Therefore,
borders shield the average country from slow growing neighbors. There is, however, a wide
dispersion of eﬀects around this mean. This suggests that these simple summary statistics
mask relevant country-speciﬁc features of the border eﬀect on growth.
Figures 1 through 8 provide perhaps a more complete picture. They plot the distributions
of the estimated eﬀects. The total size eﬀect ∆G is generally positive but moderate, in
most cases smaller than 0.5 percentage points of annual growth. The eﬀect of full political
integration ∆Gm is more symmetrically distributed around zero, with slightly fatter tails.
Turning to the decomposed eﬀects conﬁrms previous observations, namely that the interaction
term eﬀect is tightly distributed around zero, while the steady-state determination eﬀect is
slightly skewed, with a negative mean.
4.2.2 An Example: France and Italy
While these summary statistics and plotted distributions are useful, they are no substitute
for the estimates obtained individually for each pair of adjacent countries. To illustrate the
results, we can examine more speciﬁcally the example of France and Italy (Table 5). The eﬀect
on France from merging with Italy would have been quite large and positive. We estimate that
the total size eﬀect would have resulted in a gain of 0.281 points of growth annually for France.
To achieve a similar increase in growth via openness, France would have had to increase her
trade to GDP ratio by 27.79 percentage points (for comparison, the average trade to GDP
ratio of France over the sample period was 36%). Since Italy started with a lower level of
per capita income than France in 1960, but has a higher estimated steady-state income level
given its observed steady-state determinants, France would also have gained from the steady-
state determination eﬀect. This eﬀect alone would have accounted for ∆Gm − ∆G =0 .492
23additional points of growth.31
Turning to the eﬀect on Italy from merging with France, it follows from what precedes
that the steady-state determination eﬀect would have been negative for Italy. Moreover,
t h ep o s i t i v es i z ee ﬀe c to fam e r g e ro nI t a l i a ng r o w t h ,e q u a lt o0.237, would not have been
suﬃcient to outweigh the negative steady-state determination eﬀect. Under full integration,
Italy would have lost −0.316 points of growth annually. A possible interpretation of these
results is that, if France and Italy could somehow have achieved the more restrictive form
of political integration implied by the “size merger” deﬁnition, i.e. a removal of the border
without changes in national savings rates, human capital, etc., both could have beneﬁted in
terms of growth.
Interested readers can ponder upon the estimated eﬀects of their favorite hypothetical
political merger among the 246 examples listed in Table 6.
4.2.3 Residual Eﬀects
Section 3.3 above outlined a methodology to include the residuals from the growth and
openness regressions into our analysis. Table 6 (columns 9 and 10) presents estimates of
∆Gme and ∆Ge as in equations (40) and (41). The distribution of these eﬀects is also
d i s p l a y e di nF i g u r e s9a n d10. Interestingly, the results do not change as much as expected
given that the explained portions of growth and openness in the baseline regressions are only
60% and 50%, respectively. The simple correlation of ∆G with and without the residual eﬀect
is 0.737, while the corresponding ﬁgure for ∆Gm is 0.640.O u t o f 246 mergers, accounting
for the residual leads to a change in the sign of the eﬀect in 31 cases for ∆G (12.6% of the
cases) and 75 cases for ∆Gm (30.1%).32
Again, the case of France and Italy is illustrative (Table 5). Because France’s explained
31This is another way of saying that Italy was a faster growing country than France over the time period
c o v e r e di nt h es a m p l e .I nf a c t ,t h ea v e r a g eobserved annual growth rate of per capita income in Italy over the
1960-1989 period was 3.40%, while for France it was 2.94%. Our model predicts that, if France and Italy had
merged, their uniﬁed growth rate over this period would have been 3.15% per year (under “full integration”).
32In general, accounting for the residual eﬀect has a much smaller eﬀect on estimates of pure size mergers
than it does on estimates of full integration, because the former only involves the residual from the openness
regression (multiplied by the coeﬃcient on openness in the growth regression), while the latter involves the
population weighted average of the residual from the growth regression. See equations (40) and (41).
24annual growth falls short of its observed growth by 0.56 points, while Italy’s observed and
explained growth are about equal, accounting for the residual in the merger experiment is
now slightly beneﬁcial to Italy - which would have gained both under a size merger and full
integration.
4.2.4 Eﬀects on Steady-State Income Levels
Columns 11 and 12 of Table 6 presents, for each country pair, the estimated eﬀect of a merger
on the steady-state income level of country a,w h i l et h el a s tr o wo fT a b l e4p r e s e n t ss u m m a r y
statistics for the steady-state level eﬀects (the distribution of these level eﬀects is displayed
in Figures 11 and 12 for a size merger and full integration, respectively). On average, size
mergers would raise a country’s steady-state income level by 10.98 percentage points and full
integration would reduce it by 2.07 percentage points. These averages reﬂect the generally
positive eﬀect of a size merger and the ambiguous eﬀect of full integration. However, they
again mask considerable case-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences. The eﬀect of full integration ranges from
−421.07 percentage points (the eﬀect on Malta from merging with Algeria - a small rich
country merging with a relatively large poor country) to 325.63 percentage points (the eﬀect
on Papua New Guinea from merging with Australia - a small poor country merging with a
rich country with ﬁve times its population). Logically, large eﬀects such as these are found
in cases where neighbors have very diﬀerent sizes and income determinants.
More moderate eﬀects are found in regions that are homogeneous in terms of income
and size. For example, Table 5 shows that a size merger between France and Italy would
have raised both countries’ steady-state income levels by 25.1 percentage points for France
and 21.12 points for Italy. Full integration would have reduced Italy’s steady-state income
by 15.89 percentage points. This partly reﬂects compounding the negative growth eﬀect on
Italy of full integration with France, as discussed earlier. The merger would raise France’s
steady-state income by 57.01 points, reﬂecting Italy’s superior steady-state determinants.
4.3 Convergent Interests in Political Integration
An interesting application of our framework is to examine pairs of countries that would have
both beneﬁted from merging politically. As suggested above, it is much easier for two countries
to have convergent interests in a size merger than in full integration, because the eﬀect of
the former is far more likely to be positive for any given country. Out of the 123 political
25mergers we considered in this paper, 94 entail growth gains for both country a and country
b b a s e do nasize merger alone,a n do n l y6 cases did the trade reduction eﬀect dominate in
both countries - so that both would have experienced reduced growth under a merger. These
cases pertain to pairs of very small and already open countries, such as Singapore and Hong
Kong or Jamaica and Haiti.
More interestingly perhaps, in only 14 cases would both countries in a merging pair have
beneﬁted from full integration in terms of economic growth.33 These pairs are listed in Table
7. Salient examples include Argentina and Chile, France and Germany, Canada and the
US, India and Pakistan, as well as several country pairs involving Brazil. Of course, many
more cases would entail a winner and a loser among the merging pair. 92 cases out of 123
entail exactly one country that would have gained from full political integration, while the
other would have lost, and in the remaining 17 cases both countries would have lost. The
conclusion is that, in 109 of the 123 cases we considered, borders shield at least one country
from the other.
An implication of these observations is that, when unions of country pairs are considered,
it may be easier to gain mutual support for a form of political integration that shields countries
from having to share their Zat and Wat variables but focuses instead on taking advantage of
scale eﬀects, through the formation of free trade areas and the reduction of physical trading
costs.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has provided a theoretical framework to understand the relationship between
political borders and growth. We suggested that, whenever scale eﬀects are present, political
borders aﬀect steady-state per capita income levels and transitional growth rates by reducing
the extent of the market. We also pointed out that, in a world of more than two countries,
the removal of only one border will result in trade reduction from the merging countries
vis-à-vis the rest of the world, with correspondingly adverse eﬀects on growth and income.
We examined formal conditions under which the extent of the market eﬀect dominates the
33All of these pairs are also composed of countries that would both have beneﬁted from size mergers with
each other.
26trade reduction eﬀect, and discussed situations in which countries might diﬀer in more that
just size and openness levels.
We then derived an empirical speciﬁcation directly from the theoretical model, and found
strong empirical support for the predictions of our theory. The parameter estimates from this
empirical model were used to estimate, for speciﬁc countries, the growth eﬀects of merging
with another country. We have applied this framework to 123 pairs of adjacent countries and
proximate islands.
Our framework can be extended in several directions. Firstly, we have limited our in-
vestigation to hypothetical mergers involving only two countries. However, our framework is
readily applicable to studying the growth eﬀects of more than one political border. We could
apply our methodology, for example, to the removal of all borders within Europe, in order
to study the growth implications of proposals for European political integration. Our results
for France and Germany suggest that both would have beneﬁted, in terms of growth, from
merging politically. Whether European countries would have beneﬁted from the removal of
all intra-European borders is an open and equally interesting question.
Secondly, our estimation method focuses exclusively on growth and income levels. There
are obviously many other reasons, beyond growth, why countries would want to merge or
stay separate. We can interpret our estimates of the growth eﬀects of borders, whenever they
are negative, as the amount of growth a country is willing to forego in order to avoid the
non-economic costs of sharing a single polity with a neighbor. These may include increases
in cultural, ethnic, religious or linguistic heterogeneity. Future work could relate changes
in heterogeneity resulting from political integration to the magnitude of the growth costs
or beneﬁts. One interesting hypothesis to test is whether countries that remained separate
despite large potential growth eﬀects of merging have done so because political integration
would have entailed large increases in heterogeneity.
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Appendix 1
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
1) Output in steady-state in each region i belonging to country a is decreasing in the














Sn(1 − ξa − ξn)
2α−1
1−α < 0 (50)
2) Output in steady-state in each region i belonging to country a, is increasing in size Sa.
Consider a change in size Sa that leaves the total size of the world W unchanged. Hence,
such increase must change the size of at least another country. Without loss of generality,
assume that the change aﬀects a country b of size Sb, while leaving all other countries diﬀerent
from a and b unaﬀected.34 Hence, by substituting Sb = W −Sa−
P
n6=a,b
Sn in (11) and taking
the partial derivative of yss










[1 − (1 − ξa − ξb)
2α−1
1−α ] > 0 (51)
3) The positive eﬀect of size Sa on steady-state output is larger for less open countries
(i.e., for countries with a larger ξa). The negative eﬀect of barriers on steady-state output is
larger (in absolute terms) for smaller countries.
34The result can be easily generalized to the case in which the increase in country a’s size is matched by













(1 − ξa − ξb)
2α−1
1−α > 0 (52)
QED.
Appendix 2
Reduced Form Parameters in equation (36):

                      
                      
γ0 = β0 + β2α0
γ1 = β1






µit = εi + β2νit
30  31
Table 1 - System Estimates of the Growth Equation 
 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
* Denotes significance at the 90% confidence level; ** denotes significance at the 95% level. 
92 observations in specifications for 1960-1989 and 77 observations in the specifications for 1960-1998. 
Estimated jointly with the openness equation. 
 1960-1989  1960-1998 
  3SLS 3SLS SUR 3SLS 3SLS SUR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  2.217 -14.447 8.676  9.783 -16.243 15.415
  (3.327) (2.760)** (2.662)** (4.697)** (3.574)** (3.127)**
Log population  0.678 1.337 0.263 0.472 1.387 0.130
  (0.185)** (0.254)** (0.134)**  (0.249)* (0.311)** (0.136)
Open* Log pop  -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 -0.001
  (0.003)** (0.004)* (0.002)*  (0.004) (0.006)* (0.002)
Openness  0.081 0.118 0.040 0.055 0.124 0.010
  (0.023)** (0.032)** (0.017)**  (0.036)* (0.048)** (0.019)
Log 1960 per   -1.120 0.120 -1.262  -1.437 0.322 -1.611
capita income   (0.269)** (0.205) (0.245)** (0.321) (0.216) (0.263)**
Fertility Rate  -0.185 -0.308  -0.601 -0.717
  (0.121) (0.114)**  (0.152) (0.136)**
Male human  1.550 1.745  0.079 0.010
capital  (0.443)** (0.402)**  (0.317) (0.295)
Female human  -1.183 -1.415  0.162 0.165
capital  (0.472)** (0.433)**  (0.395) (0.373)
Government   -0.053 -0.061  -0.024 -0.031
consumption ratio  (0.020)** (0.019)**  (0.018) (0.017)*
Investment rate  0.091 0.087  0.073 0.075
  (0.024)** (0.022)**  (0.026) (0.021)**
R-Squared 0.558  -0.277 0.683  0.662 -0.221 0.726  32
Table 2 – System Estimates of the Openness Equation 
 
 1960-1989  1960-1998 
 3SLS  3SLS  SUR  3SLS  3SLS  SUR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  161.089 169.337  152.610  253.343 196.654 255.884
  (33.890)** (34.354)**  (34.432)**  (47.309)** (49.215)** (47.731)**
Log population  -6.744 -15.003  -5.862  -7.723 -15.356 -7.093
  (2.671)** (2.254)**  (2.699)**  (3.185)** (2.935)** (3.213)**
Log 1960 per   1.335 3.378  1.888  1.526 0.753 1.696
capita income   (3.868) (4.139)  (3.902)  (4.802) (5.314) (4.826)
Log land  -9.868    -10.537 -10.511 -11.271
area  (2.124)**    (2.179)** (2.542)** (2.596)**
Terms of   -45.202    48.984 373.600 377.467
trade shocks  (205.930)    (221.254) (291.622) (302.285)
Oil   13.999    9.771 -13.199 -15.031
dummy  (21.898)    (23.596) (28.132) (29.393)
Landlock  -2.472    1.807 -6.386 -5.702
Dummy  (8.889)    (9.602) (10.285) (10.772)
Island  3.186    4.337 12.643 11.276
Dummy  (7.766)    (8.351) (9.934) (10.385)
R-Squared 0.508  0.333  0.511  0.506 0.270 0.507
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
* Denotes significance at the 90% confidence level; ** denotes significance at the 95% level. 
92 observations in all specifications for 1960-1989 and 77 observations for 1960-1998. Estimated jointly 
with the growth equation. 
 
 
Table 3 - First stage F-Tests for the Instruments 
 
Specification Test  Openness  Openness*Log 
Population 
(1) F(11,  73)  3.11  3.09 
 (p-value)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
(2) F(11,  78)  3.55  3.72 
 (p-value) (0.0005)  (0.0003) 
 
   33
Table 4 – Summary Statistics of the Effects of Border Removals 
Based on Specification (1) estimates 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Observed average growth  2.127  1.671  -1.231  6.580 
Fitted growth   2.167  1.369  -0.006  6.150 
Direct effect of size  0.745  0.743  0.005  3.452 
Indirect effect via openness reduction  -0.601  0.600  -2.784  -0.004 
Effect via change in interaction term  -0.021  0.405  -2.400  1.056 
Steady-state determination effect  -0.235  0.678  -3.442  2.350 
G (“size merger”)  0.123  0.377  -1.733  1.367 
G
M (“full integration”)  -0.112  0.914  -4.965  3.350 
Openness equivalent (“size merger”)  10.184  22.517  -40.281  184.332 
Openness equivalent (“full integration”)  0.403  43.089  -144.379  315.772 
G
e (“size merger” with residual effect)  0.097 0.524  -4.214 1.511 
G
me (“full integration” with residual effect)  -0.092 1.047  -4.036 4.220 
SSY (steady–state level effect of a “size merger”) (%)  10.976 33.623  -154.651  121.956 
SSY
m (steady–state level effect of “full integration”) (%)  -2.068 83.400  -421.068  325.630 




Table 5 - An Example: France and Italy 
 
Effect on (country a):  France  Italy 
of merging with (country b):  Italy  France 
Observed Growth (country a)  2.936  3.404 
Fitted Growth (country a)  2.374  3.464 
Direct effect of size  0.491  0.451 
Indirect effect via openness  -0.396  -0.364 
Effect via change in interaction term  0.186  0.149 
Steady-state determination effect  0.492  -0.553 
G (“size merger”)  0.281  0.237 
G
m (“full integration”)  0.773  -0.316 
Openness equivalent (“size merger”)  27.789  24.300 
Openness equivalent (“full integration”)  76.423  -32.492 
G
e (“size merger” with residual effect)  0.294  0.265 
G
me (“full integration” with residual effect)  0.474  0.006 
SSY (steady–state level effect of a “size merger”) (%)  25.099  21.122 
SSY








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7 – Pairs of countries that would both have gained from full political integration 
(G
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